US Demands Iran Remove Uranium While Waiving Rules for Saudi; Vienna 2026

Key Points

• The United States signed a US-Saudi 123 Agreement on May 13, 2025, alongside a $142 billion defense package during President Trump’s Riyadh visit
• The US-Saudi agreement omits all three pillars of the Gold Standard: the enrichment ban, reprocessing ban, and IAEA Additional Protocol precondition
• A separate Iran MOU framework was circulated in early June 2025, requiring Iran to transfer its enriched uranium stockpile out of the country
• Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on CBS News on June 13, 2026 that dilution of Iran’s 440.9-kilogram stockpile of 60%-enriched uranium inside Iran is Tehran’s “only acceptable position”
• Araghchi’s statement directly rejects the US framework’s requirement that material be “taken out of the country,” reported by Axios and confirmed by US officials
• The two agreements impose incompatible nuclear standards on two countries Washington claims to hold to the same nonproliferation regime
• Vice President J.D. Vance was designated to attend the proposed Geneva MOU signing ceremony
• Iran formally tabled its position through Oman forty-eight hours before US strikes began, making Araghchi’s CBS appearance a public restatement rather than opening gambit

Washington (Evening Washington News) June 13, 2026 – The United States cannot simultaneously demand that Iran transfer its enriched uranium out of the country and permit Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium without the nonproliferation framework Washington spent seventeen years enforcing, according to analysis of the two agreements signed within thirty-one days of each other. The US-Saudi 123 Agreement signed on May 13 and the Iran MOU framework circulated in early June impose incompatible nuclear standards on two countries Washington claims to hold to the same nonproliferation regime.

How Did Iran’s Foreign Minister Respond to the US Uranium Removal Demand?

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on CBS News on June 13 that dilution of Iran’s 440.9-kilogram stockpile of 60%-enriched uranium inside Iran is Tehran’s “only acceptable position,” as reported by CBS News.

The statement directly rejects the US framework’s requirement — reported by Axios and confirmed by US officials — that the material be “taken out of the country”.

He delivered it hours before the proposed Geneva MOU signing ceremony that Vice President J.D. Vance was designated to attend.

As reported by Margaret Brennan of CBS News during the “Face the Nation” interview, Araghchi argued that “enrichment is our right” and stated

“as a sovereign country, we have every right to decide for ourselves, by ourselves”.

The Iranian foreign minister, who helped negotiate the 2015 nuclear deal under the Obama administration, emphasized that

“We have developed this technology by ourselves, by our scientists, and it’s very dear to us,”

making it “a matter of dignity and pride for Iranians”.

What Critical Elements Did the US-Saudi 123 Agreement Omit?

The US-Saudi 123 Agreement, signed alongside a $142 billion defense package during Trump’s Riyadh visit, omits all three pillars of the Gold Standard for nuclear cooperation, according to reporting by NDTV.

The omitted pillars include the enrichment ban, the reprocessing ban, and the precondition requiring IAEA Additional Protocol ratification before any US export licenses are issued. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had previously stated in 2018 that the Trump administration was insisting Saudi Arabia accept

“the same limits on uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing as other Mideast nations,”

calling for a “gold standard section 123 agreement” that “would not permit them to enrich”.

The White House claimed the deal included agreements for energy, mining, and defense, representing the largest defense sales agreement in history at nearly $142 billion, providing Saudi Arabia with state-of-the-art warfighting equipment, as reported by Radio Free Europe.

Prior to signing, Trump welcomed a pledge from Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman for $600 billion in investments, joking the figure should be $1 trillion.

Why Do These Two Agreements Create Incompatible Nonproliferation Standards?

The two agreements signed within thirty-one days of each other — the US-Saudi 123 Agreement on May 13 and the Iran MOU framework circulated in early June — impose incompatible nuclear standards on two countries Washington claims to hold to the same nonproliferation regime, according to the original reporting.

The US proposal presented to Iran on Saturday would permit “a limited degree of low-level uranium enrichment on Iranian territory for a yet-to-be-defined duration,” according to information obtained by Axios from two knowledgeable sources.

However, this confidential proposal contradicts public assertions by senior officials. House envoy Witkoff and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have both publicly asserted that the US will not permit Iran to enrich uranium and will insist on complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, as reported by Axios.

By making this proposal, the Trump administration risks facing criticism from allies in Congress and Israel, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s administration and numerous Republican senators urging strict boundaries against any uranium enrichment.

What Position Did Iran Formally Table Through Oman Before US Strikes?

Araghchi’s CBS appearance was not an opening gambit — it was a public restatement of the position Iran formally tabled through Oman forty-eight hours before US strikes began, according to the original reporting. The Iranian foreign minister announced on

“Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan”

that the two sides will come together again in Geneva, stating

“the only way to find a resolution for Iran’s nuclear program is through diplomacy, while stressing that a solution is within reach”.

Negotiators for the US and Iran met last week in Geneva, where both sides said progress was made, according to CBS News.

President Trump said amid a massive military buildup in the region that he’s considering a limited military strike on Iran, after warning that Tehran had a matter of days to reach a deal or “bad things” would happen. Araghchi stated

“there is no need for any military buildup, and military buildup cannot help it and cannot pressurize us”.

Background: The Evolution of US Nuclear Cooperation Standards in the Middle East

The Gold Standard for nuclear cooperation emerged during the Obama administration’s 2015 negotiations with Iran, establishing three critical pillars that became the benchmark for US nuclear partnerships in the Middle East.

The USBAR (United States-Bahrain Atomic) agreement and the UAE 123 Agreement both incorporated these standards, which included explicit prohibitions on uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing.

Only the United Arab Emirates and Taiwan have accepted these Gold Standard limitations in the past, according to the Washington Institute for Peace and Security.

The 123 Agreement framework is named after Section 123 of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, which governs transfers of nuclear equipment and material to other nations.

Previous administrations consistently insisted on Gold Standard terms for Middle East nations seeking commercial nuclear energy deals with US companies.

Secretary Pompeo’s 2018 statement to Saudi Arabia represented the longstanding US position that all Middle East nations should accept identical limits.

The Iran MOU framework circulated in early June 2025 represents a significant departure from this established precedent.

The proposal outlines “preliminary ideas” for discussion including requirements that Iran temporarily lower enrichment levels to 3%, render underground enrichment facilities “non-operational,” and create a

“robust system for monitoring and verification”

with immediate IAEA approval. Sanctions relief would only be granted once Iran “demonstrates real commitment” satisfying both the US and IAEA.

Iran’s current stockpile of 440.9 kilograms of 60%-enriched uranium represents material that can be relatively quickly refined to weapons-grade levels, according to reporting following the US-Israeli bombing campaign against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Araghchi insisted during his CBS interview that this material remains “buried beneath the rubble” of attacked nuclear facilities, stating

“if one day we come to the conclusion to recover them, it would be under the supervision of the agency”.

Prediction: How This Contradictory Policy Will Affect Middle East Nations and Global Nonproliferation Efforts

This development will likely create significant uncertainty for Middle East nations seeking US nuclear cooperation, as the contradictory standards undermine the credibility of Washington’s nonproliferation commitments.

Countries like Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan that previously expected consistent Gold Standard requirements may now question whether political alignment with Washington determines nuclear cooperation terms rather than established nonproliferation principles.

Iran will face increased pressure to either accept the uranium removal requirement or risk military confrontation, as Araghchi acknowledged that

“if the U.S. attacks us, then we have every right to defend ourselves”

and

“we have to hit, you know, the Americans’ base in the region”.

The Iranian foreign minister questioned why conflict would be necessary

“when there is every possibility for a peaceful solution”.

Saudi Arabia’s newly permitted enrichment capabilities could trigger a regional nuclear escalation, with other Middle East nations potentially seeking similar uranium enrichment programs.

The ACA (Arms Control Association) warned that the proposed agreement lacks strict nonproliferation safeguards and could open the door to Saudi uranium enrichment. This development contradicts Pompeo’s 2018 assertion that Washington would insist on identical limits for all Middle East nations.

Republican senators including Jim Risch (R-Idaho) and Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.) had separately stated that any 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia should be a “gold standard” agreement prohibiting uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.

The deviation from this position may create additional congressional opposition to the agreement and weaken bipartisan support for Middle East nonproliferation initiatives.

The international nonproliferation community will likely view this contradictory policy as undermining the 17-year framework Washington established, potentially reducing cooperation from other nuclear nations on enforcement measures.

The two mutually exclusive versions of the Iran-US MOU that exist, with Saudi Arabia named as an approver but having no channel to verify which text its 123 Agreement depends on, creates additional confusion about regional nuclear commitments.